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This study was undertaken to define the problems
associated with the issuance and management of unpriced
orders (UPOs) under Basic Ordering Agreements (BOAs) at the
Navy Aviation Supply Office (ASO). The researcher attempted
to determine the solutions to these problems and develop a
model or thought process for acquisition managers to use in
the issuance and management of UPOs.
The researcher learned that the issuance of UPOs were
interrelated with the requirement to obligate funds in
maintaining adequate inventory levels and the enhanced
competition goals which resulted from the Competition in
Contracting Act of 1984. Driving forces behind the overaged
backlog of UPOs were an inadequate workforce, insufficient
automated data processing equipment and the inability to
enforce the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
def init izat ion requirements. These requirements relate to
both the issuance and def i ni t i zat i on of UPOs.
The inability to definitize in a timely fashion has
caught the attention of both the public and Congress.
Internally, the Navy has instituted several corrective
measures which include: required reductions in UPO backlog,
requirements to receive adequate price proposals in advance
of issuing UPOs greater than $1 million and contract clauses
which allow the government to stop progress payments to
contractors who fail to submit proposals within the required
t i me frame.
ASO has developed a math model which assists management
in the control of UPOs. It takes into consideration the
funds available for obi i gat ion/ i nvent ory replenishment, the
required rate of competition and the Navy instituted UPO
backlog reduction level.
The researcher has modified the ASO model by adding to
the thought process and has reached the conclusion that the
manager is not able to make UPO decisions without considering
other factors within the acquisition environment. Most
importantly, the researcher believes that the decision making
process should be decentralized to the acquisition manager
and that he should be free to make decisions affecting UPO
activity levels and given adequate resources, but at the same
time his performance ratings should be predicated on his
ability to meet the current def ini t i zat ion timeframes
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL
Unpriced orders (UPOs) are categorized under the broad
grouping of unpriced contract actions (UCAs) which also
includes letter contracts and unpriced change orders which
result from engineering change proposals (ECPs). All three
of these contractual actions have something in common, they
are normally issued in advance of pricing, hence they are
issued unpriced and are priced retrospectively. Since most
guidance applies to unpriced contract actions, the researcher
will refer to both UCAs and UPOs throughout the thesis. In
most instances UPOs are issued with a ceiling price and are
later negotiated. This process has been termed definiti-
zation and leads to the establishment of a firm fixed priced
order.
A basic ordering agreement (BOA) is a bilateral agreement
between the government and the contractor which contains
appropriate contract terms and conditions. The order under
the applicable BOA terms and conditions represents the actual
contract. BOAs do not normally specify individual line
items, quantities or prices. The UPO order will indicate
detail specifications or a statement of work. The BOA can be
structured to cover various time lengths, which may include
possibly one, two or three years.
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BOAs are briefly described in the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR), part 16.703 as:
A written instrument of understanding, negotiated between
agency, contracting activity, or contracting office and a
contractor, that contains (1) terms and clauses applying to
future contracts (orders) between the parties during its
term, (2) a description, as specific as practicable, of
supplies or services to be provided, and (3) methods for
pricing, issuing, and delivering future orders under the
Basic Ordering Agreement. A Basic Ordering Agreement is
not a contract.
The FAR defines BOA applicability by stating that:
A Basic Ordering Agreement may be used to exedite
contracting for uncertain requirements or supplies or
services when specific items, quantities, and prices are
not known at the time the agreement is executed, but a
substantial number of requirements for the type of supplies
or services covered by the agreement are anticipated to be
purchased from the contractor. Under proper circumstances,
the use of these procedures cart result in economies in
ordering parts for equipment support by reducing
administrative leadtime, inventory investment, and
obsolescence due to design changes.
Additional characteristics include the following:
1. Description of the method to be used in determining
contractual prices.
£. Applicable delivery terms and conditions.
3. List of activities authorized to issue orders on DD
Form 1155 or Standard Form £6.
4. The appropriate means by which an order is either
accepted or rejected.
The BOA will be reviewed each year and any revisions will
not be made by modifying the BOA itself in a retrospective
fashion. The BOA will be modified by a bilateral agreement
between the contractor and the government. The revised BOA
will only apply to orders issued after the effective date of
the modification. The BOP cannot be modified by the order.
The contracting officer shall follow all other acquisition
regulations and laws such as the Competition in Contracting
Act (CICA). Prior to issuing an order, the contracting
officer must either price the order in advance or issue a
ceiling priced order, which limits the government's
liability, or he may issue a UPO with no ceiling. The FAR
requires that if a ceiling priced order or UPO is issued, the
contracting officer must ensure that one of the following
corid i t i ons i s met :
1. The BOA provides for adequate pricing early in the
performance of the work; or
2. The need for the supplies or services is compelling and
unusually urgent. In this situation, the contracting
officer shall price the order as soon as practical.
The Navy Acquisition Regulations Supplement (NARSUP)
states that written approval from the Office of the
Secretary of the Navy (Contract Business Management) will be
obtained prior to the establishment of a BOA that includes
provisions for price redetermination. Each BOA will
stipulate timeframes for the receipt of contractor proposals
which usually fall no later than 60 days after the receipt of
the orders. In addition, an agreed upon def ini t i zat ion date
will be identified. The NARSUP further stipulates that the
def init izat ion date shall not exceed either 180 days
following the issuance of the order, or the completion of 40
percent of the work performed by the contractor, whichever
occurs first.
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B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The purpose of this study was to reach a better
understanding of the use and control of UPOs under BOAs at
ASO. Primarily, the researcher attempted to determine the
reasons for issuing unpriced orders, associated problems and
appropriate management control procedures.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1 . Primary Question :
a. What are the principal problems in the
establishment and management of UPOs under BOfts
and how might these problems be resolved?
£. Secondary Questions :
a. What are the characteristics and principal uses
of a UPO under a BOA?
b. What are the major driving forces behind the
requirement for issuing UPOs under BOAs?
c. What are the problems in the management and
control of UPOs under BOAs?
d. How do we resolve the previously addressed
problems?
e. What model or thought process can acquisition
officials use in the management of UPOs?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this study covers the issuance of UPOs at
ASO. Due to time and thesis length constraints, the study
focuses on the reasons for issuing UPOs and the management
control procedures utilized until def ini t i zat ion. The
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researcher did not attempt to develop an innovative pricing
technique which in turn would help reduce the overdue backlog
of UPOs. The study is limited to one Inventory Control Point
(ICP) and several item managers. This does not imply that
the research findings do not apply to BOfls issued and managed
by other Department of Defense (DoD) activities.
It is assumed that the reader has a basic understanding
of general supply procedures including ICP objectives
concerning spare parts provisioning and procurement.
E. METHODOLOGY
The researcher utilized the services of the Defense
Logistics Supply Information Exchange (DLSIE), Defense
Technical Information Center (DTIC) and the Federal Legal
Information Through Electronics Research Report (FLITE) in
attempting to obtain research literature. These searches
revealed that there was a limited amount of literature
available concerning UPOs. The researcher also utilized DoD
and Department of the Navy (DON) instructions, Naval Audit
Service Reports and Congressional testimony.
The primary research methodology was the use of personal
and telephonic interviews with key personnel at the systems
command level, and requirements and purchasing personnel at
the field level.
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F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The researcher learned that the issuance of UPOs were
interrelated with the requirement to obligate funds in
maintaining adequate inventory levels and the enhanced
competition goals which resulted from the Competition in
Contracting Act of 1984. Driving forces behind the overaged
backlog of UPOs were art inadequate workforce, insufficient
automated data processing equipment and the inability to
enforce FOR definit izat ion requirements. These requirements
relate to both the issuance and definit izat ion of UPOs.
The inability to def init ize in a timely fashion has
caught the attention of both the public and Congress.
Internally, the Navy has instituted several corrective
measures which include: required reductions in UPO backlog,
requirements to receive adequate price proposals in advarice
of issuing UPOs greater than $1 million and contract clauses
which allow the government to stop progress payments to
contractors who fail to submit proposals within the required
t i me frame.
ftSO has developed a math model which assists management
in the control of UPO issues. It takes into consideration
the funds available for obi i gat ion/ invent ory replenishment,
the required rate of competition and the Navy instituted UPO
backlog reduction level.
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The researcher has modified the ASO model by adding to
the thought process and has reached the conclusion that the
manager is not able to make UPO decisions without considering
other factors within the acquisition environment. Most
importantly, the researcher believes that the decision making
process should be decentralized to the acquisition manager
and that he should be free to make decisions affecting UPO
activity levels and given adequate resources, but at the same
time his performance rating should be predicated on his
ability to meet the current def ini t i zat ion timeframes
promulgated in the FAR.
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The study is broken down into four chapters. Chapter I,
the Introduction, attempts to explain to the reader what
research concerning UPOs orders was done and how it was
accomplished and the associated significance of the
findings. Chapter II, the Framework and Background chapter
explains to the reader how BOAs and UPOs a.ve utilized and
also provides history and background information. The
Framework and Background chapter describes recent Navy Audit
Service findings, Congressional testimony given by the
Secretary of the Navy, current Navy/ASO policy, future DON
plans and possible Congressional intervention. Chapter III,
Presentation of Data and Data Analysis/ Interpret at i on,
provides in a combined format both presentation of data
14
collected during the research and a data analysis and
interpretation. The researcher did this in an attempt to
provide a more concise and coherent thesis. Chapter IV,
Conclusions/Recommendations, contains the conclusions to the
research effort. Additional areas of research for follow on
work ar^e provided.
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II. FRAMEUORK AND BQCKGROUND
The use of BOAs represents a method of contracting which
was introduced to alleviate the administrative burden placed
on contract ng personnel. BOAs were issued on a yearly basis
to sole—source contractors who normally provided repair parts
to the government on a repetitive basis. The order which is
issued against the BOA contains specific information cancern-
ing requirements. An unlimited number of orders can be
placed against a BOA. This results in a shorter procurement
administrative lead time (PALT) and less contractual
documentation than the same number of non-BOA contracts being
issued. The BOA was introduced to help streamline the
acquisition process and to help government acquisition
managers meet fleet requirements more efficiently. CRef. 13
A Naval Audit Service report dated 16 December 1985 at
the Navy Plant Representative Offices (NAVPROs) in Lynn,
Massachusetts; Stafford, Connecticut; St. Louis, Missouri;
and Bethpage, New York revealed the following:
Undef init i zed orders authorize a contractor to start work
before a price has been set. The procurement regulations
that allow for undef init i zed orders require that prices be
negotiated within 180 days after issuance of an
undef init i zed order or by the time 4i3 percent of the work
is completed, whichever occurs first. Undef init i zed orders
are usually placed by procuring activities such as the
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and the Navy Aviation
Supply Office (NASO) via procurement instruments known as
Basic Ordering Agreements (BOAs). Each order placed under
a BOA constitutes a separate contract and in most cases the
resident Naval Plant Representative Office (NAVPRO) is
required to negotiate the price of the order.
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The report continues in its description by stating:
The audit disclosed that the backlogs of undef ini t i zed
orders at the NAVPROs audited grew 55 percent between 30
September 198£ and 30 June 1385, the backlogs at these
NAvPROs totaled 4,760 orders valued at about $3. 86
billion. About $£. 1£ billion of these orders had remained
undef ini t i zed longer than the I StZi days allowed by a Navy
regulation. About $63.4 million in orders in a.r\ audit
sample of $188 million remained undef i ni t i zed even though
work was 8lZi to IiZiiZi percent complete.
As a result of late pricing, the Government was placed at a
disadvantage in negotiating prices; the contractor's
incentive to control costs was diminished; there was a risk
of entering a prohibited cost
—
pi us-percent age-of-cost
contracting mode; ari estimated $699 million remained
obligated unnecessarily on the basis of excessively high
pre—negot iat ion cost estimates; and the Navy could be
denied the use of art estimated $£'17 million in excessively
obligated funds when the related appropriations expired.
We also found that the orders were priced after reaching a
near-completion stage, art average 11-percent profit was
allowed. We concluded that profit on such orders should be
limited to no more than 8 percent, and estimated that if
NAVPROs continued to award profits at art 11—percent rate,
about $18.9 million in excess profits would be awarded as
the 30 June 1985 backlog was worked off. CRef. £:p. 13
Mr. E.G. Carnmack, the Director of Contracts and Business
Management, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics) (ASN (S&L) ) issued a memorandum
dated £3 October 1985 which concerns undef ini t i zed
contractual actions. The memorandum included a draft policy
directive for undef ini t i zed contractual actions and requested
comments from all systems command headquarters. A copy is
provided as Attachment (B). Policy highlights include:
1. The reduction in the number and dollar value of
unpriced orders issued in FY86 by £5 percent compared
to FY85.
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2. The requirement for the receipt of art adequately
prepared and supported proposal prior to the issuance
of a UPO in excess of $1 million. Piny exceptions to be
approved by the Head of Contracting Agency (HCPl).
3. The provision for withholding progress payments on
contracts where proposals a.t^e delinquent.
4. The use of statistical pricing techniques for spare
parts excluding tools, accommodation equipment and
items considered susceptible to overpricing.
5. The inclusion of UPO performance def i ni t i zat ion as a
key Command indicator.
6. The negotiation of profit rates which are reflective of
the risk associated with the manufacturing process at
the time of def i nit i zat ion.
7. The proh i bi t at ion of UPO use for any service or
requirement which cannot be clearly defined.
8. The proh
i
bit at ion of adding additional requirements to
existing orders.
PISO sent a memo titled, "Input for Discussion with PiSN
(S&L) Re: Undef i ni t i zed BOO Orders" to The Naval Supply
Systems Command (NflVSUPSYSCOM) . The memorandum is included
as Attachment (C). PiSO stated that BOfts served as effective
administrative tools to promptly place on order the
requirements for aviation spare parts and the repair of
repairables. PiSO recognizes that the problem stems from the
perception that UPOs are definitized late and that
negotiations result in excess profits to the contractor. In
addition, PiSO made the following recommendations:
1. The backlog of UPOs should be stratified by the
contractor and by the administrative phase of
definitizat ion.
IS
2. Increase the use of correspondence with contractor
personnel from the Director of Purchasing.
3. Initiate the use of tiger teams to facilitate
negot i at ions.
4. Expedite business clearance processing.
5. Expand the use of Forward—Priced Rate Agreements
(FPRA)
.
On 4 November 1985, Secretary Pyatt, ASN (SSL), issued
guidance concerning UCAs. The memorandum is included as
Appendix (D). Secretary Pyatt indicates that UCAs have been
used primarily to satisfy fleet requirements, maintain
obligation plans and meet program schedules. Secretary Pyatt
states that UCAs do not achieve cost control and directed the
following actions:
1. Reduce the number of UCAs issued in FYS6 by E'iZi percent
and the outstanding dollar value by 30 percent compared
to the end of FY85.
2. Review UCAs for possible deobligation of funds.
3. Require the receipt of Art adequate price proposal prior
to the issuance of a UCA in excess of $1 million. Any
exceptions to be approved at flag/senior executive
service levels.
4. Require that contractors propose and segregate costs by
order.
5. Include a contract provision for the withholding of
progress payments for delinquent proposal submission.
6. Disallow the inclusion of additional requirements to
existing orders.
7. Prohibit the use of UPOs for contractor support
services or in other instances where requirements
cannot be adequately defined.
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8. Include UCA def ini t i zat ion performance as a key Command
i nd icat or.
9. Negotiate profit rates commensurate with the level of
the risk experienced by the contractor at the time of
definit i zat ion.
The researcher believes that the guidance provided in the
final format (Attachment (D) ) closely resembles the rough
draft (Attachment (EO). Further guidance from Secretary
Pyatt was provided in a memorandum dated £6 February 1986.
The memorandum is provided as Appendix (E). It mentions that
the major reason that UCAs go past the scheduled
def ini t izat ion dates is because of the submission of
inadequate proposals or the late submission of proposals. He
also states that in these instances the contractor continues
to be funded through progress payments. Secretary Pyatt'
s
major point is "when the contractor is delinquent in
submitting def ini t i zat ion proposals, you should withhold
progress payments. " CRef. 31
To meet Secretary Pyatt' s goals, the Operation and Policy
(OP) Branch of ASO issued a memorandum dated 18 December
1985. The memorandum is included as Appendix (F). It
acknowledges that historically, 70 percent of ASO'
s
obligations have been made by use of the BOA and instructs
item managers to increase administrative leadtimes (ALTs) to
a minimum of 90 days and up to £70 days for sole source
procurements. Item managers were directed to ensure that
items with ar\ ALT of less than three quarters be increased
£0
to three quarters. In addition, OP issued a memorandum dated
2c' April 1986 which laid the framework to meet Secretary
Pyatt's goals. The memorandum is provided as Attachment
(G). ASO estimated that the UPO level could not exceed $1.3
billion dollars as of 30 September 1986. The beginning
balance as of 1 April 1386 was $£'.6 billion. It was planned
that issues of UPOs would be limited to $100 million per
month with no UPOs issued in September. It also provided
that UPOs would be defimtized at the rate of $£00 million
per month. The future awards of UPOs were to be prioritized
as fol lows
:
1. FY86 repair of repairables.
£. Purchase requests (PRs) greater than $100K with a
projected stock-out rate within 12 months. (Commanding
Officer approval required if over Si million. )
3. PRs greater than $100K with a projected stock-out rate
within 18 months. (Commanding Officer approval
required if over Si million.)
4. Emergency PRs between $£5,000 and $100,000.
5. Other PRs.
Recently, Representative Wyden introduced a bill that
would severely limit the use of UCAs. A £4 March 1986 issue
of The Nail Street Journal indicated that Representative
Wyden wants to limit the use of UCAs to "urgent needs" but a
review of the proposed legislation indicates that by FY87,
UCAs will be limited to 10 percent of the amount of funds
appropriated for defense procurement. It also stipulates
£1
that the percentage is to be decreased to 5 percent for FY83
and FY89. The proposed legislation is provided as Appendix
(H) .
Most recently, Secretary Pyatt issued a memorandum which
indicates that he is contemplating to establish an even more
"aggressive goal" for FYS7 as compared to the goals he
established for FYS6. The goal is tentatively based on a 58
percent reduction in dollar backlog compared to FY86.
CRef. 4U
£•£
III. PRESENTATION OF DftTft ftND DftTft ftNftLYSIS
ftND INTERPRETATION
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First the
researcher will present data which relates to the secondary
research questions. Most of the data was obtained either
through personal interviews or from telephone conversations.
The second purpose of this chapter is to provide the
appropriate data analysis and interpretation. The researcher
decided that this combined format would result in less
repetition and better clarity and understanding of both the
information and interpretation.
ft. CHftRftCTERISTICS ftND PRINCIPLE USES OF ft UPO UNDER ft BOft
The researcher received a wide variety of replies when he
asked interviewees to define the characteristics and
principle uses of UPOs under BOfts. Some of the following
were provided:
1. UPOs under BOfts were originally intended to be used
only in emergent situations. ftn example would be the
procurement of a spare part that was not held in
inventory and that was required to correct a Casualty
Report (CftSREP) for surface fleet equipment or a Non
Mission Capable System (NMCS) for aviation end items.
ERef. 53
£. ft source who requested anonymity stated that, "BOfts
were established to ensure adequate inventory
protection. Normal contracting methods were utilised
to replenish inventory levels but due to uncertain
demand requirements, stock—outs occasionally occurred
and BOfts were used to bypass the Procurement
ftdministrat i ve Lead Times (PftLTs)."
c:3
3. BOAs were made available to the acquisition manager in
an effort to cut down on the administrative burden.
With an increased amount of required contractual
documentation and a workforce that trailed this
increased demand in both numbers of personnel and
training qualifications, BOAs proved to be of great
value. BOAs were established for items that were tied
to a sole source producer. BOAs were broadly written
which allowed greater flexibility to both the
government and the contractor. CRef. ID
Due to the wide variety of views concerning the
prerequisite conditions for the use of UPOs under BOAs, the
researcher believes that it is best to refer to the FAR and
NARSUP, part 16.703, quoted in the Introduction.
It is a commonly held belief that UPOs at^e not being
priced within the required timeframe of ISiZi days after
receipt of order or at the 4t3 percent completion point,
whichever occurs first. A Naval Audit Service report
indicated that approximately 64 percent of the orders in the
backlog at the NAvPROs were older than 180 days as of 30 June
1985. The Naval Audit Service selected a sample of £5 orders
at each NAVPRO and determined that it took ar\ average of £3£
days to submit cost proposals to the government and that the
average total time to definitize the orders was 633 days.
CRef. 2:p. 63
As of September 1985, DoD had almost *£7 billion in
UCAs. In November 1985, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense directed each of the services to develop goals to
reduce the volume of UCAs. The U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Armed Services held a hearing on 18 March 1986
for testimony concerning UCAs from each service secretary.
24
Congressional coricerr\ over the enormous amount of UCfis
incl uded
:
1. The possibility of the government being placed in Ari
unfavorable negotiation position.
£. The cost risk that was shifted from the contractor to
the government.
3. Reduction of contractor incentive to control costs.
LRef. £,1
During his testimony, Secretary Pyatt referenced the
Naval find it Service report which was previously mentioned and
he acknowledged that the UCP, backlog was growing and that
negotiated profits exceeded the appropriate risk experienced
by the contractor. Obligations were considered excessive but
the government's liability was limited by the use of clauses
and ceiling prices.
Secretary Pyatt stated the following policy:
1. The number of UCAs in FY86 were to be limited to SiZi
percent of the FY85 level.
£. The backlog of $10.6 billion was to be reduced to $7.
£
billion by the end of FY85.
3. Excess funds on existing UCAs were to be deobligated.
4. Adequate price proposals were to be received prior to
the issuance of a UPO in excess of $1 million.
5. Provisions for the withholding of progress payments for
delinquent proposals were to be included as a contract
provi si on.
Secretary Pyatt explained that the increased backlog was
caused by the change in pricing methodology. Because of
cases of overpricing, contracting officers may have shifted
£5
away from statistical sampling techniques to precise line
item pricing. CRef. 7:pp. 1-3]
B. THE MAJOR DRIVING FORCES BEHIND THE REQUIREMENT FOR
ISSUING UPOS UNDER BOAS
Most readers would normally consider this art easy task to
define but the researcher found it difficult to explain.
Like many other Navy procurement activities, ASO did not have
ari effective automated management information system (MIS)
for tracking the timing of the flow process for a UPO from
generation to def ini t i zat ion.
Many interviewees agreed that UPOs allowed ASO and other
DoD activities to meet the fleet's requirements, maintain
required obligation rates and sustain required inventory
levels. CRefs. 1,5,83 This has been especially apparent
during times where managers considered themselves either
undermanned or manned with untrained personnel. This brings
to light the third interviewee response discussed during the
previous secondary question which basically states that BOAs
and UPOs were introduced in art attempt to eliminate a major
portion of the administrative burden placed on the procure-
ment manager.
Use of the BOA has enabled ASO to effectively obligate
funds. Throughout the thesis, the term "obligation rate"
refers to a "macro" measure of effectiveness used by ASO
£6
in replenishing a constantly depleting inventory. ASO uses
the Uniform Inventory Control Point (UICP) replenishment
model to trigger the start of the procurement process. The
model takes into consideration many variables in determining
the reorder quantity and reorder point. The reorder quantity
refers to how much to order while the reorder point refers to
when to order. The variables include, but are not limited
to, the mean administrative leadtime (ALT), mean production
leadtimes, mean quarterly demand, associated variances, item
cost, holding costs, and administrative ordering costs.
Funding is made available through the use of the Navy Stock
Fund (NSF) account. NSF differs from traditional procurement
funding in that it is based on a pool of funds that is
recycled and ne^er expires.
These variables are input into a program termed the
supply demand review (SDR) which is periodically run to
trigger the initiation of the procurement process. Funding
is a limiting factor and since ftSO, like other DoD activi-
ties, is sometimes faced with inadequate or unstable funding
levels, the model is appropriately adjusted. This results in
unstable inventory levels. As funding decreases, the
inventory level decreases.
An additional driving force is the increased use of
competitive procurement in the acquisition of spare parts.
At first glance, the reader would think that competition and
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BOAs were inversely related, as you acquired more items
through competition you would need to procure less through
the use of BOAs.
The researcher will attempt to explain why this is not
entirely true. Congressional concern about DoD being
overcharged for supplies obtained from sole source producers
was the catalyst for the Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA) which took effect in April 1984. The end result of
CICA was the establishment of competition goals which were
gradually increased each year. These goals were imposed on
all DoD buying activities. Competition cari be closely tied
with the Buy Our Spares Smart (BOSS) program, specification
streamlining and spares breakout. Competition is considered
a driving factor for BOA use primarily for two reasons.
The major reason why competition has been a driving force
behind the use of BOAs deals with first time competitive
buys. When art item is considered eligible for competitive
procurement, a large amount of time is expended in developing
a sound Invitation For Bid (IFB) or Request For Proposal
(RFP). The buyer goes through a learning process, thus it
will take less time to process the second or third
procurement of the item. Since it is hard to plan the
breakout of spare parts and since first time competitive
procurements take a considerable amount of time, BOAs are
ideal in acquiring "stop gap material" which is intended to
£8
prevent material stock-out prior to the receipt of material
competitively procured. ASO has received additional manpower
resources to assist in meeting competition goals and E<05S
initiatives but no additional resources were allocated toward
reducing the overaged backlog of UPOs. fln additional factor
is the shift from retrospective pricing to prospective
pricing which results in longer ALT. Stop gap material can
easily be obtained through the use of a UPO. This
exemplifies an earlier premise that BOAs assist in helping
the procurement manager relieve himself of some of the
administrative burden. BOAs save time in the procurement of
non-competitive items and allow this time to be expended
toward the attainment of competition goals. CRef. 31
C. PROBLEMS IN THE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF UPOs UNDER BOAs
It is very apparent that there are Navy-wide problems in
the management and control of UPOs under BOAs. This is
clearly evident for two reasons. The first is that a major
portion of the backlog is aged or greater than the maximum
specified time frame of 180 days or 48 percent of comple-
tion. The second is the increased amount of congressional
concern as indicated by Representative Wyden (D—Oregon) who
introduced a bill to limit the use of UCAs.
As mentioned earlier, ASO did not have an effective
automated MIS system to track the procurement process which
would lead to a clear understanding of where bottlenecks
occur. fin on site review by the researcher revealed that the
current BOA process ca.r\ be characterized as mostly manual
with numerous preaward actions. Limited human and automated
data processing (ftDP) resources have further exacerbated
management's inability to internally monitor the process.
External reports include the DD Form 1057, Monthly
Procurement Summary of fictions $£'5, iZiiZiiZi or less and the DD
Form 350, Individual Contract fiction Report (over $£5,000).
The DD 1057 is submitted monthly and is a summary of
contractual actions under $£'5,000 while the DD 350 is
submitted and revised for individual contractual actions
greater than $£5,000 when different milestones are reached,
fin initial problem experienced was that DD 350s were tracked
only for acquisitions made for the current yea.r. This
created a.ri unusable reporting system since def i nit i zat ion
periods normally extended between different years. The
reporting system has been changed to allow the tracking of
procurements over different years.
On the government's side, the standard explanation for
excess def i nit i zat ion periods was the late submission of ari
adequate cost proposal or amplifying data. fin additional
reason was the inability to receive timely recommendations
from the administrative contracting officer and the Defense
Contract fiudit Agency.
30
On the other hand, contractors felt that they took due
diligence in providing supportable cost proposals. When
asked to speak freely ori a non—at t r i but e basis, one
contractor stated, "We do not take the required 180 day or 40
percent complete def i ni t i zat i on requirement that seriously
since the government tends to place the def i ni t i zat i on of
UPOs or) the "back burners" as compared to other upfront
pricing actions."
Most importantly, it was agreed to by both the government
and the contractor that there was some fault attributable to
both part ies.
One of the biggest problems experienced by ASO was
previously mentioned as a driving factor. Specifically this
problem deals with the interrelationship between the
available amount of funds to obligate in maintaining adequate
inventory levels, the required percentage of competitive
awards and the ability to use a UPO as opposed to a
prospectively priced order. ASO describes this intei
—
relationship as a triurnverate with the three factors being
obligations/readiness, unpriced orders and competition. It
has been a well—known fact that DoD has had a difficult time
in fully supporting all existing weapon systems. The
explanation for this situation is beyond the scope of this
thesis but funding constraints seem to be a limiting factor.
It was not evident that ASO wasteful ly obligated funds or had
any reason to wasteful ly obligate them for unnecessary items
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since PSO uses NSF and is in the business of supporting
someone else's, namely the fleet's, requirements. CRef. 8D
In most circumstances, PSO personnel may use the
following contracting methods to acquire repair parts:
1. Competition.
£. Sole source negotiation.
3. Prospectively priced order under BOP.
4. UPO under BOP.
CICP and BOSS have resulted in the increased use of
competition. Most acquisition managers feel that competition
is the preferred method of contracting but they also agree
that the initial use of competition requires additional
effort. The Navy's Competition Pdvocate required that DON
activities attain competition goals. PSO has been tasked to
achieve the following competition goals:
FY 85 33 percent
FY 86 40 percent
FY 87 42 percent
It should be mentioned that BOPs may be used for
competitive procurements. If a contractor successfully
negotiates a fair and reasonable contract price through the
competitive proposal process, an order may be issued to
contract for the requirements if a BOP currently exists with
the appropriate terms and conditions. CRef. 53 The
additional time required for initial and succeeding
competitive procurements causes a corresponding decrease in
the time available for the other three methods of
contract ing.
The recommendation of Secretary Pyatt to "negotiate
provisions in new BOOs and orders to withhold progress
payments where history of delinquent proposal submission
exists" attracts the concern of both government and industry
personnel. This would require a bilateral agreement of both
parties and some consider the withholding of progress
payments to be punitive which the procurement regulations
disallow. In addition, this requirement would be very
difficult to enforce unless the government could prove that
it was completely free of fault. The additional
administrative burden must also be considered prior to the
use of this measure.
Congress holds the belief that contractors receive too
high of a profit considering the risk involved. This sterns
from the fact that BOAs are normally definitized well into
contract performance when the contractor should have a
reasonable handle on costs. CRef. 6D
Pin additional problem is experienced by the PROs. ASO
definitizes approximately 70 percent of UPOs and delegates
the def init izat ion for the remaining UPOs to the PROs. The
PROs have an extremely difficult time trying to effectively
manage their work when they have no idea of what work
requirements will flow down to them. CRef. 5D
j/j>
It must be remembered that the use of UPOs cannot be
completely banned due to the need to contract for the repair
of Depot Level Repairables (DLRs) and to satisfy emergent
requirements. In some instances the repair of DLRs ca.r\ be
carried out by the use of two different orders. The first
order would be prospectively priced for open and inspection
(O&I) effort. After OS- 1, the contractor would then submit a
cost proposal to the government which would allow the
negotiation of a prospectively priced order. However, the
use of a UPO may still be more feasible because the method
described above requires prospective agreement on O&I charges
for all DLRs and the use of two contractual actions to
perform the same task performed by a single UPO.
BOAs also serve as a quick means to satisfy emergent
requirements. For these reasons, the removal of the UPO from
one of the methods of contracting is not considered feasible.
D. METHODS TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH UPOs
ASO has implemented two different programs which should
assist in properly determining the timeframes associated with
the PALT process. These programs include bar code technology
and a BOA Liquidation Tracking System (BLT) . The procurement
process at ASO c&rt be closely associated with other
activities such as Navy Regional Contracting Centers and
Naval Supply Centers. The process csirt be described as mostly
non-automated. Taking a tour through the BOA buying
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division, one would first notice the enormous number of
folders which correspond to individual procurement requests
(PRs) . To assist the tracking of the PRs through the
individual procurement phases, ASO has placed bar code labels
on the individual folders. A wand, similar to those found at
many department stores, is used to read the bar codes as the
PR travels through each procurement phase.
The BLT system is designed as a computerized milestone
monitoring system to track the progress of BOA related PRs
greater than $25, iZHZtlZi from receipt until the final DD 35£i has
been submitted. The BLT input form contains 14 different
pricing action milestones. CRef. 103
NAVSUPSYSCOM has introduced the Productive Unit
Resourcing System (PURS) which should help ASO improve in the
area, of human resources. PURS covers procurement operations,
contract administration and contract pricing functions.
Basically, it provides for the establishment of labor costs
per productive unit. NAVSUPSYSCOM provides standard manhours
and productive units associated with different pricing
actions. For example, placing art order under a BOA is given
13 standard hours or one productive unit while establishing
the BOA itself is worth £6 standard hours or two productive
units. Prior to the start of each year, NAVSUPSYSCOM
negotiates rates with each procuring activity. Negotiations
consider past performance and projected workload. During
performance, if ASO achieves a better rate, then it shares
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with NAVSUPSYSCOM in the savings. Some managers at^e
concerned that cyclic fluctuations may cause an unstable
workforce where personnel will be hired and layed off
according to the workload. Accordingly, they request that
the periods be annual or semiannual periods instead of
quarterly or monthly. In addition, the removal of personnel
ceilings as of 1 October 1986 will allow management greater
flexibility in designing the ideal workforce. For example,
when a GS-13 transfers, management can either hire a
replacement GS-13 or hire two lower paid GS-7s. CRef. 1
1
3
Secretary Pyatt's requirement to receive an adequate cost
proposal prior to issuing a UPO in excess of $1 million
should speed up the def ini t i zat ion process. Many agree that
this method is preferred to stopping progress payments for
contractors who a^e delinquent in the submission of a cost
proposal
.
In the ar^ea of excess profits, ASO contends that
contracting officers are negotiating profit commensurate with
the risk involved. In addition, Contract Review Board (CRB)
procedures presently provide for the proper review of all
cost elements.
ASO is currently in the process of reviewing all existing
UPOs through the use of the BLT system and deobli gating funds
if the obligated amount is determined to be in excess.
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E. MODEL OR THOUGHT PROCESS AVAILABLE TO ACQUISITION
OFFICIALS IN THE MANAGMENT AND CONTROL OF UNPRICED ORDERS
All interviewees agreed that the use of UPOs should be
internally managed by each service and not by Congress. Some
outsiders to the procurement process at ASO believe that UPOs
can be done away with but as previously explained, there is
not a suitable contracting method available to replace UPOs,
in some unique applications.
The most feasible solution offerred was to allow the free
and open use of UPOs with the only stipulation being that the
def i ni t i eat ion requirements be enforced. In essence, this
allows art activity to issue as many UPOs as it desires as
long as the activity meets the def ini t i zat i on requirements.
In periods when the requirements are not met, the activity
must cease issuing UPOs until overaged UPOs are priced. A
less stringent proposal operates in the same basic fashion
but allows for a small number of overaged UPOs. Most
interviewees agreed that Secretary Pyatt was correct in
stressing the importance of UPO pricing performance as a key
Command indicator. CRef. 13
As mentioned previously, UPOs cannot be managed in a
vacuum. Both obi i gat ions/ i nventory levels and competition
must be considered. In meeting Secretary Pyatt' s required
reduction in UPO backlog and competition goals, ASO uses the
following mathematical computation:
Year Long Obligation Goal
Less: Obligations to Date
Equals: Future Obligations
Less: Projected Military Interservice Procurement
Requests (MIPRs) and Request for Contract
Procurements (RCPs) to be sent outside ASO
Add: Projected MIPRs/ RCPs to be received by ASO
Equals: Balance to Go
Add: Base Award Amount (consists of obligations to date,
less: MIPRs/ RCPs sent out, and add: MIPRs/ RCPs
received )
Equals: Total Projected Competition Base CRef. a:
Then the total projected competition base is multiplied
by the required competition goal (40 percent for FY86) to
determine the amount of funds which must be competitively
obligated for the remainder of the year. The actual
competitive award dollars are then subtracted from this year
long amount to determine the amount which must be
competitively obligated in the remaining months. This amount
would be subtracted from the "Balance to Go" to determine the
amount of funds that can be obligated in a non-competitive
manner. These amounts can either be obligated in a
prospectively priced or retrospectively priced fashion.
At this point ASO then determines the amount of funds
which can be obligated by UPOs and still meet the required
reduction in backlog goals. First, the end of the year goal
must be determined. This was determined by reducing the
backlog level experienced during prior fiscal year 1985 by 30
percent. This is the amount which ASO must not exceed by
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the end of fiscal year 1986. The following computations are
then made:
Beginning UPO Balance
Add: UPO Issued to Date
Less: Def i ni t i zat ions to Date
Equals: Current UPO Balance
Less: Projected Def mi t 1 zat ions
Equals: Ending UPO Balance Without Issues
Less: End of the Year Goal
Equals: Funds Available that can be Obligated by UPO
CRef. 81
The "Funds Available that can be Obligated by UPO" can
now be subtracted from the previously computed funds that can
be obligated in a non-competitive manner to determine the
amount of funds that can be non-compet i t i vel y obligated but
in a prospectively priced fashion.
It is clearly evident that the procurement manager is
faced with a myriad of requirements which are interrelated.
The suggestion of an additional method of control seems
to be a very effective measure. It was recommended that for
UPOs less than $1 million, progress payments can be better
used to motivate contractors to submit adequate price
proposals in a timely fashion. The BOA could be modified to
reflect the stipulation that for non-emergent requirements
under $1 million, the contractor would be allowed to obligate
funds and receive compensation through the Progress Payments
clause for only long leadtime material. After the government
receives an adequate price proposal, the contractor would
then be allowed to obligate funds and seek reimbursement for
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expenses other than long leadtirne material. Emergent
requirements would not be affected by this clause. This
recommendation would allow the obligation of funds by the
government and motivate the contractor to submit proposals in
a timely fashion. Overall, the use of the UPO will shorten
the ALT process and this requirement will reduce the
def init i zat ion period. CRef. 5D
4IZI
IV. CONCLUS I ONS/ RECPMMENDflT I QNS
The researcher attempted to answer the following primary
research question: What are the principle problems in the
establishment and management of UPOs under BOfts and how might
these problems be resolved?
Analysis of the data obtained strongly indicates that
several problems exist.
UPOs as a rule are not being definitized within the
timeframes required by the FAR. There are two major reasons
for the late def ini t i zat ion of UPOs. The longest standing
reason is the inadequacy of both human and P.DP resources
provided to the procurement manager. BOP.S were originally
provided to the procurement manager in ari attempt to lessen
some of the administrative burden which precluded the
effective and efficient acquisition of defense material. The
second and most recent reason was the enactment of the CICP)
of 19B4. This act was the catalyst for an increased use of
competition. Each activity has been tasked with meeting
directed competition goals. These goals have been described
as being very optimistic. The increased use of competition
and the def ini t i zat ion of the overaged backlog requires
additional resources. The use of UPOs has enabled
procurement managers to meet aggressive competition goals
while at the same time meeting obligation rates and
maintaining required inventory levels.
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UCAs have gained increased Congressional and public
interest due to the general nature of the items procured.
The overpricing of some spare/repair parts has focused
attention to all associated areas including the method of
contract ing.
In part, Congressional awareness has been the cause for
some of the solutions to the UPO problems. In particular,
each service has provided testimony to Congress stating their
respective plans to reduce the level of backlog. Secretary
Pyatt has introduced numerous actions which should alleviate
the backlog problem. The increased awareness up and down the
chain of command will improve the UPO process. Most
important is the required UPO backlog reduction goals and the
requirement to receive adequate price proposals prior to the
issuance of a UPO in excess of $1 million.
In the area of personnel resources, the acquisition
manager should receive assistance through the introduction of
PURS.
It is strongly felt that the Navy cart correct any
existing UPO problems without Congressional reform.
Representative Wyden' s bill as introduced is considered to be
very restrictive and unnecessary. The bill, which will
ultimately reduce the level of UCft activity to 5 percent of
the funds available for obligation, may cause greater
potential pricing problems. The inability for contracting
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managers to use UPOs does not necessarily mean that the
government will receive a better contract price. Contractors
may have a negotiation advantage if the government is
required to prospectively price all orders and meet emergent
requi rernent s.
To a certain degree, any required competition goals will
control the level of UPO activity. The Navy's self-imposed
UPO backlog reduction goals will bring the backlog down to a
manageable level. The best method of control is to
decentralize the dec i sion—maki ng authority down to the
acquisition manager and enforce the FPlR def i ni t i sat i on
requirements by making def i ni t i zat i on performance a key
Command indicator.
In summary, the ability to choose the level of UPO
activity should be left to the acquisition manager as long as
the def i nit i zat ion requirements are met. The mathematical
model offered by ASO should be combined with the following
recommendation by LCDR R. w". Smith and the requirement
established by Secretary Pyatt:
1. For non-emergent UPOs under $1 million, require that
contractors expend funds for only long leadtime
material until the submission of art adequate price
proposal. The BOA would be modified to reflect this
requirement and the Progress Payments clause would
serve as a control mechanism.
£ Require the submission of art adequate price proposal
prior to the issuance of a UPO greater than $1 million.
An area of further research would be the study or the
comparison between the prospective and rest respect i ve pricing
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of spares. Of interest would be the determination of which
method would lead to the fairest and most reasonable price t




DEF I N I T I QNS /ABBRE V I AT I DNS
BASIC ORDERING AGREEMENTS (BOAs) - A contractual document
which allows for the purchase of supplies. Individual orders
may be placed against the BOA which contains the appropriate
terms and conditions.
CEILING PRICE - Applicable to undef 1 ni t i zed contract actions
which are retrospectively priced. The ceiling price is an
amount which limits the government's liability. The ceiling
price may also be considered a not to exceed amount normally
based on either a government estimate or the contractor's
est imate.
FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (FAR) - A codification of
federal acquisition regulations governing both DoD and
non-DoD activities.
UNDEFINITIZED CONTRACT ACTIONS (UCAs) - A family of
unpriced/ceiling priced actions which include letter
contracts, unpriced orders under BOAs, engineering change
proposals.
UNPRICED PURCHASE ORDERS (UPOs) - Unpriced/ceiling priced
orders under Basic Ordering Agreements.
APPENDIX (B)
OCT 2 2
Subji UNDEFINITIZED CONTRACTUAL ACTIONS
Encli (1) DRAFT POLICY ON UUDEFINITIZZD CONTRACTUAL ACTIONS
Th« Navy has a significant and growing backlog jJ rouef ii<it;Ls£d
and contractual actions. An increasing percentage o- the actions
are not being priced In a timely manner. These actions include
ceiling priced orders, letter .contracts , change orders and lung
lead amendments. The ceiling' priced orders have the. fewest cortrols
and the highest rate of growth.
Enclosure (1) is being proposed us a poller directive on chi
issue. Your comments are requested by 29 October I9S5. The CI.'AS
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MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION
Subj : UNDEFINITIZED CONTRACTUAL ACTIONS
Current data indicates the Navy has backlog of 11,762
unpriced actions valued in excess of 9.5 billion dollars. Over
50Z of the dollars are overaged, in excess of 5 months old. Both
the size and age of the backlog are of concern. Navy policy is
to price in advance whenever possible. The continuing growth of
both the backlog of unpriced actions and their age supports the
need for additional management emphasis.
Effective immediately, I am directing the following actions:
..
1. Systems Commands and Inventory Control Points are to
reduce the number and dollar value of unpriced/ceiling priced
orders issued in FY-86 by 251 compared to FY-85.
2. Contractor proposals are to be requested and determined
sufficient for negotiations prior to issuing any unpriced/ceiling
priced order projected in excess of $1 million dollars. Orders
are not to be severed to avoid this requirement. Exceptions must
be documented and approved by the head of the contracting
activity (HCA)
.
3. Provisions for the withholding of progress payments where
contractor proposals are delinquent should be negotiated in new
contracts, BOAs and orders where possible.
4. The use of statistical pricing techniques is authorized
for spare parts, excluding tools, accommodation equipment and
items considered by contracting officers to be most susceptible to
overpricing.
5. The backlog and age of undefinitized contractual actions
should be considered a Command key indicator, placing management
emphasis and visibility on the problem.
6. Profit rates negotiated in the definitization of unpriced
orders must reflect the risk or lack of risk associated with the
manufacturing process at the time the order is being priced.
7. Unpriced/ceiling priced orders are not to be used for
services or in any case where the requirement is not clearly
defined.
8. Subsequent to their issue, additional requirements shall
not be added to existing orders.
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APPENDIX (C)
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
AVIATION SUPPLY OFFICE
7O0 ROBBINS AVENUE
PHILADELPHIA. PA. 19111 IN REPLY BtFl* TO
PG-A:JRB
4200
1 5 OCT 1985
From: Commanding Officer, Navy Aviation Supply Office
To: Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command (SUP 02)
Subj: INPUT FOR DISCUSSION WITH ASWS&L) RE UNDEFINITIZED BOA ORDERS
1. Background. Basic Ordering Agreements (BOA) and ceiling
priced/monetary limitation orders thereunder have been used by ASO as an
effective administrative tool to promptly place on order requirements
for aviation spare parts and repair of repairables. The use of this
tool allows ASO to maximize material readiness and minimize inventory
investment by reducing procurement administrative lead times. Final
pricing of orders is effected after careful review of DCAA/ACO audits,
detailed analysis of relevant facts, and detailed negotiations with the
contractor. This process permits the Contracting Officer to make a
reasoned determination as to the fairness and reasonableness of the
price and to assure that prices paid reflect the intrinsic value of an
item.
2. The Problem. There is a perception that BOA orders do not provide
adequate control of costs and result in mismanagement of appropriated
funds. This perception stems from what is perceived to be excessive
time to definitize orders resulting in transfer of cost-risk to the
government and loss of available funds. Audits have focused attention
on delays in the definitization process citing large backlogs,
apparently high profits relative to diminished risk and loss of
obligation authority.
3. The Situation at ASO. For the quarter ending 30 June 1985, ASO
reported a total ot 4190 orders at an amount of $2,188,272,000. Of this
total, 860.(20.5%) orders for $956,536,000 (43.71) were over 180 days.
Due to the high volume and dollar value of procurements at ASO in FY 85
(nearly double the dollar value of FY 84), the numbers reported (though
the percentage may be smaller) will increase for the period ending 30
September 1985. Aside from whether 180 days is the right criteria for
determining overage, (ASO considers that it is not), aggressive action
must be taken to reduce the backlog of undefinitized orders and reduce
reliance on such orders.
4. ASO Action.
fu Stratify the backlog. Action is in process to develop a further
breakdown and update^ of the present backlog by contractor and by
administrative phase of definitization (i.e. awaiting proposal, awaiting
audit, etc.). Completion is targeted for 18 October 1985.
b. Increase delegation. Action is in process to identify those
additional definitization actions that, based on a careful review of
relevant factors, should be delegated to the appropriate ACQ for pricing.




Subj: INPUT FDR DISCUSSION WITH ASN(S&L) RE UNDEFINITIZED BOA ORDERS
c. Correspond with senior contract officials. Based on the
analysis of the backlog (para. 4a.), prepare written correspondence from
Director of Purchasing-, 'ASO to appropriate contractor executives
identifying problem areas and requesting appropriate action. This is to
supplement previous correspondence and to present it to a higher level
of contractor management. Such letters will focus on late submittal of
proposals, inadequate support of proposals, delays in negotiation, etc.
Completion is targeted for 31 October 1985.
d. Direct Discussion by PG-A. Those firms identified in 4a as
having the largest volume in backlog of actions and dollars in
undefinitized orders, with emphasis on present and historical overage
condition, will be visited directly by PG-A or invited to attend such a
meeting at ASO to obtain top level contractor commitment to eliminating
the backlog of averaged orders. This is a follow-on to an existing
program of contractor visitations. Commence follow-on discussions by
1 November 1985.
e. Use of Tiger Team. ASO intends to utilize negotiation teams
composed of contracting officers, contract specialists, pricing analysts
(AGO) and financial analysts (DCAA) as necessary at selected contractor
locations to rapidly negotiate workable unpriced orders with those,
contractors identified in 4a and as discussed in 4d. Commence
negotiation at selected contractors by 15 November 1985.
f. Recommendations for Expedited Business Clearances. ASO will
request NAVSUP and ONAS assistance in expediting and consolidating
business clearances for actions associated with reducing the
undefinitized order backlog. Submit specific request to NAVSUP/ONAS by
31 October 1985.
g. Expand use of Forward-Priced Rate Agreements (FPRA). FPRA
expedite the defintization process. Hold discussions with ACO/DCAA at
those locations where a current FPRA does not exist and assist as
necessary in effecting such an agreement. Also, where applicable,
pursue negotiated Article, Price Lists as a means to expedite toward
pricing of routinely procured items. Commence discussions with ACO/DCAA
by 1 November 1985.
h. Reduce reliance on Unpriced Orders. Conduct a. review in
conjunction with the requirements determination division (WM) to
identify those orders which do not require expedited ordering action and
thus can be pre-priced. It is recognized that many valid reasons exist
to continue use of the unpriced order as a contracting tool. Some of




Subj: INPLTT FOR DISCUSSION WITH ASN(SSL) RE UNDEFINITIZED BOA ORDERS
. 1) Improved readiness. Requirements are placed on order and in
production/repair much faster than is possible with other contractual
instruments with resultant earlier delivery to the Fleet.
2) Minimize inventory investment. PIPELINE is minimized with
resultant positive impact on budgeting/funding.
• 3) SAIP (Spares Acquisition Integrated with Production) savings
are achieved. The window of opportunity for placing orders concurrent
with production generally cannot be met without the use of undefinitized
orders.
4) Improved responsiveness. Urgent requirements generally
necessitate use of undefinitized order to authorize immediate contractor
action.
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- Additional, requirements shall not be added to orders which
have been placed.
- Unpriced/celling priced orders are not to be used for
contractor support services or In any case where the
requirement Is not clearly defined.
- The backlog and age of undef 1 n 1 1 1 zed contractual actions
should be considered a command key Indicator, placing routine
management emphasis on the Issue.
- Profit rates negotiated In the def I n I
t
Izat Ion process must
reflect the risk or lack of risk associated with the
production status at the time of def I n I
t
Izat Ion.
It Is Important that we reaffirm our policy to price In •
advance. Advance p 1 ann I ng 'shoul d eliminate the need In many
cases to Issue undef In 1 1 1 zed contractual actions. Your
aggressive action and full support are essential If we are to
maintain the ability to selectively use undef Inl t Ized
contractual Instruments under appropriate conditions.
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Subj: PROGRESS PAYMENTS UNDER UNDEF IN I TI ZED CONTRACTUAL ACTIONS
This memorandum provides additional guidance to my memorandum
of k Nov 1985 expressing concern that undef In 1 1 1 zed contractual
actions do not provide the necessary Incentives to achieve cost
control .
Our review of causes of backlog growth In undef In 1 1 1 zed
contractual actions Indicates that a major contributor to the
problem Is failure of contractors to submit def In 1
1
Izat Ion proposals
In accordance with the "t Imef rames set forth In the contract. These
delinquencies go to the heart of the ability of the Government to
achieve timely contract def In 1 1 1 zat Ion. The failure to meet this
material requirement of the contract occurs partially because the
Government funds the performance via the use of progress payments.
The contractor reduces his risk by taking longer to deflnltlze the
contract, while continuing to perform work.
When the contractor Is delinquent In submitting def In 1
1
Izat Ion
proposals, you should withhold progress payments.
APPENDIX (F)
WPC2-20:TW
1 8 DEC 1985
OP POLICY AND PROCEDURE MEMO# 110
From: OP
Subj: ESTABLISHMENT OF A MINIMUM PROCUREMENT ADMINISTRATIVE
LEADTIME FLOOR
Ref: (a) ASN Memo, Subj: Undefinitized Contractual Actions dtd 4 Nov 85
(b) WM-A Memo, WM-11:JLW dtd 9 Dec 1985
1. Reference (a) directs a 20% reduction in unpriced BOA (Basic
Ordering Agreement) actions and a 30% reduction in the dollar value of
unpriced orders by 30 September 1986. This is the first step by SECNAV
to enforce firm fixed prices prior to the award of spares orders and
other contracts. Since 70% of ASO's obligations have historically
consisted of unpriced orders, compliance with the firm fixed price
policy will extend administrative leadtimes a minimum of 90 days and as
much as 270 days for every sole source buy (60% of our dollars in FY86).
2. As a consequence of the expected ALT (Administrative Leadtime)
extension, a mechanized browse was performed in conjunction with
December's quarterly levels to ensure a minimum ALT of 3 quarters for al 1
i terns in the MDF. This was accomplished by setting the procurement
leadtime DEN B011A, equal to the production leadtime, DEN B010, plus 3
quarters for all items having less than a 3 quarter difference. Items
having ALTs greater than 3 quarters (procurement leadtime larger than
production leadtime plus 3 quarters) were bypassed.
3. Item managers performing manual leadtime maintenance are to ensure
that a minimum of 3 quarters ALT is reflected. A larger ALT may be
assigned when based upon actual experience. Reference (b) previously
directed this change.
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2 2 APR 1536
OPERATIONS POLICY AND PROCEDURE MEMO #145
Subj : APPROVAL LEVELS FOR ISSUANCE OF UNPRICED ORDERS
Ref: (a) PG Unpriced Order Update Briefing of 7 Apr 1986
(b) WM-A Memo WM-11:JLW dtd 4 February 1986
(c) WM-A Memo WM-11:JLW dtd 25 March 1986
1. Reference (a), provided an executive briefing on the progress of making
our Unpriced Order (UPO) goal of $1.9 billion in undef initized (unpriced)
orders. Based on PG's def initization target of $1.8 billion to $2.1 billion
we have a forecasted $300 million to $677 million UPO limitation for the
remainder of this fiscal year. This value is in contrast with the estimated
$1.4 billion of requirements awards by PG between 1 April and 30 September
1986 to meet minimum fleet readiness requirements. Conversely, this equates
to issuing Firm Fixed Priced (FFP) contracts totalling $700 million to $1.1
billion. In order to ensure all three execution goals are met (i.e., $1.9
billion 30 September 1986 UPO balance, 40% Competitive awards, $3.6 billion
requirements execution awards) Intensified management is required at all
levels. Accordingly, progress toward each goal will continue to be
reported at the weekly Requirements Execution Board (REB) and the following
morning's Executive Board Meeting.
2. WM shall prioritize the unawarded BOA PRs as follows:
a. FY86 ROR orders.
b. PRs greater than $100K with a projected stock-out or site stand-up
within 12 months (CO UPO approval required over $1 Million, WM approval
required less that $1 Million).
c. PRs greater than $100K with a projected stock-out or site stand-up
within 18 months (approval same as 2. b. above).
d. Emergency PRs between $25K and $100K as occurring and approved by
WM-A.
e. PRs not included above.
3. WM shall take action to code the DSF to indicate those PRs which have
been approved for release as UPO. The total value of categories a through
d above shall not exceed $300 million without approval of the REB.
^sr
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WP-01:RBW
I Z APR 1996
Subj : PROCESSING OF UNPRICED ORDERS
4. WP shall control Che remaining $200 million UPO balance as follows:
a. GFE BOA UPO required to meet production schedules (OP approval
required up to $1 million, CO approval over $1 million) using similar
procedures established by reference (b) and (c)
.
b. Urgent FMS and PTD BOA UPO with OP approval up to $1 million and CO
approval over $1 million. WS shall forward requirements via WP-01 using
similar procedures established by reference (b) and (c)
.
5. PG has agreed to:
a. Report the value of undef initized orders remaining at the end of
each month.
b. Release UPO up to $100 million less than the amount of definiti-
zations each month between 1 April and 31 August 1986 based on the
target def initizations by month (column (b)). PG will control the
issuance as follows:
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Beginning 1 Apr to 30 Sep Planned Projected
UPO Target UPO UPO EOM
Balance Di=finitizati on Issues Balance
April $2.6B $200M $100M $2.5B
May $2.5B $200M $100M $2.4B
June $2.4B $200M *100M $2.3B
July $2.3B $200M $100M $2.2B
August $2.2B $200M $ 100M $2. IB




6. The above targets include all ord ers placed by PG since 1 April
regardless of the month reported in the financial records.
APPENDIX (H)
99th CONGRESS
2d Session H. R. 4461
To amend title 10, United States Code, to impose limitations on the obligation
and expenditure of funds and the making of progress payments by the
Department of Defense with respect to so-called undefinitized contractual
actions.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March 20, 1986
Mr. Wyden (for himself, Mr. Bryant, Mr. Sekoeski, and Mrs. Boxer) intro-
duced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed
Services
A BILL
To amend title 10, United States Code, to impose limitations on
the obligation and expenditure of funds and the making of
progress payments by the Department of Defense with
respect to so-called undefinitized contractual actions.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tines of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 That this Act may be cited as The Unpriced Military Con-
4 tracts Reduction Act of 1986.
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21 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS BY THE DEPART-
2 MENT OF DEFENSE FOR UNDEFINITIZED CON-
3 TRACTUAL ACTIONS.
4 (a) In Geneeal.—For fiscal years 1987, 1988, and
5 1989, the total amount of funds appropriated or otherwise
6 made available to the Department of Defense that is obligat-
7 ed or expended by the Secretary of Defense and the Secre-
8 taries of the military departments with respect to undefini-
9 tized contractual actions may not exceed
—
10 (1) with respect to fiscal year 1987, 10 percent of
11 the amount of funds appropriated or otherwise made
12 available to the Department of Defense for procure-
13 ment for that fiscal year; and
14 (2) with respect to each of fiscal years 1988 and
15 1989, 5 percent of the amount of funds appropriated or
16 otherwise made available to that Department for pro-
17 curement for that fiscal year.
18 (b) Definition.—In this section "undefinitized con-
19 tractual action" has the meaning given such term in section
20 2325(c) of title 10, United States Code (as added by section
21 2(a)(1)).
22 SEC. 2. RESTRICTIONS ON UNDEFINITIZED CONTRACTUAL AC-
23 TIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
24 (a) In General.—(1) Chapter 137 of title 10, United
25 States Code, is" amended by adding at the end thereof the
26 following new section:
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31 "§ 2325. Undefinitized contractual actions: restrictions
2 "(a) The head of an agency may not enter into an unde-
3 finitized contractual action unless the contracting officer for
4 the contract justifies the use of such an action in a certificate
5 of urgency. The certificate of urgency shall be included in the
6 file on the contract and shall include the following:
7 "(1) The date on which performance under the
8 contractual action is required to be completed.
9 "(2) An estimate of the damage that will be in-
10 curred by the United States if the performance is not
11 completed on or before that date.
12 "(3) The date on which the need for such per-
13 formance was first apparent.
14 "(4) If, after the need for such performance was
15 first apparent, there was sufficient time for such per-
16 formance to be acquired through contracting proce-
17 dures other than the use of an undefinitized contractual
18 action, a detailed explanation of the reasons for delay
19 in initiating the acquisition through those contracting
20 procedures.
21 "(5) If, after the need for such performance was
22 first apparent, there was insufficient time for such per-
23 formance to be acquired through contracting proce-
24 dures other than the use of an undefinitized contractual
25 action, a detailed description of the circumstances lead-
26 ing to the problem of insufficient time and of actions
• HR 4461 IH 5g
41 that will be taken by the head of the agency to avoid
2 the repetition of such a problem.
3 "(b) The head of an agency may not make any payment
4 for work in progress with respect to an undefinitized contrac-
5 tual action on or after the earlier of
—
6 "(1) the date on which 40 percent of the perform-
7 ance required under the contractual action is complete;
8 or
9 "(2) the end of the 180-day period beginning on
10 the date that performance is begun under the contrac-
11 tual action.
12 "(c) In this section, 'undefinitized contractual action' is
13 a contractual action entered into by the Secretary of Defense
14 or a Secretary of a military department for which the con-
15 tractual terms, specifications, or price are not definite before
16 performance is begun under the contractual action. Such
17 term includes the following:
18 "(1) Letter contracts or orders.
19 "(2) Provisioned item orders.
20 "(3) Change orders or contract modifications.
21 "(4) Purchase orders.
22 "(5) Basic ordering agreements.
23 "(6) Time and material contracts.
24 "(7) Labor-hour contracts.".
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51 (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chap-
2 ter is amended by adding at the end thereof the following
3 new item:
"2325. Undefinitized contractual actions: restrictions.".
4 (b) Effective Dates.—(1) Subsection (a) of section
5 2325 of title 10, United States Code (as added by subsection
6 (a)(1)), applies to undefinitized contractual actions that are
7 entered into after the date of the enactment of this Act.
8 (2) Subsection (b) of such section does not apply to un-
9 definitized contractual actions
—
10 (A) that are entered into before the date of the
1
1
enactment of this Act; and
12 (B) under which performance is more than 40 per-
13 cent complete on such date.
14 (c) Transition Provisions.—With respect to an un-
15 definitized contractual action described in subsection (b)(2),
16 the head of an agency may not
—
17 (1) make any payment for work in progress after
18 such date; or
19 (2) negotiate a final price for such action that
20 allows a profit for such action of more than 5 percent
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